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Article

Research on Equilibrium Decision-making of Car-hailing Market under Government Supervision

Yang Qian1,*, Hao Li2, Xu He1

1School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China.

2Western Transportation and Economic Social Development Research Center, Chongqing 400074, China.

*Corresponding author: Yang Qian

Published: December 22,2022 How to cite this paper

Abstract

Aiming at the risk of “management failure” in the car-hailing market under strong government spervision, the government regulation intensity is introduced to describe the car-hailing market under government supervision, and the Stackelberg game model of the government-led car-hailing platform is constructed. The pricing equilibrium of the car-hailing platform and the optimal regulatory strategy selection of the government are discussed, and the changes of service pricing and revenue of the car-hailing platform under the strong government regulation are analyzed. The research shows that, the government’s regulatory decision on the car-hailing market depends on the proportion of passengers who attach importance to safety and the proportion of extraction of car-hailing platforms. The smaller (larger) the impact of government regulation on drivers (passengers) and the larger the proportion of passengers who attach importance to safety will increase the service pricing and the number of passengers, thereby increasing the revenue of car-hailing platforms.

KEYWORDS: Car-hailing, government supervision, two-sided market, pricing decision, stackelberg game

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How to cite this paper

Yang Qian, Hao Li, Xu He. Research on Equilibrium Decision-making of Car-hailing Market under Government Supervision. OA Journal of Economy and Management, 2022, 1(3), 180-184.


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